TAXATION OF IMPUTED INCOME

I MPUTED income, once neatly defined as "a flow of satisfaction"' from
goods owned and used by the taxpayer or from benefits arising through
the exertions of the taxpayer on his own behalf,' is generally deemed
not within the ambit of the American income taxing provisions.2 Thus,
items which actually represent an increase in economic power, such as
farm products consumed by the farmer and his family, domestic services of the housewife, and rental value of owner-occupied property, 4 are
not subject to the federal income tax.
To this general rule there is an exception primarily carved out by
cases and Treasury rulings involving insurance agents.5 That is, an insurance agent is taxed on commissions from policies he writes on his own
life,6 although, in effect, he is merely enabled to purchase the insurance
at a reduced premium. This exception extends as well to an agent purchasing insurance on members of his family, key employees, and partners, 7 and regardless of whether he is a direct representative of an insurance company or merely a salesman for a general insurance agency.8
'Marsh,

The Taxation of Impnted Income, 58 POL. Sci. Q. 514. 0943).

'For discussions of the imputed income problem, see VIcKcEY,
(x947) 5 Marsh, supra note i.
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Homer P. Morris, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928) (dictum), INTERNAL REVENUE
SERvIcE, FARMERS' TAX GUIDE 12 (1958). This rule apparently extends also to rents

received from tenants in crop shares, which are not required to be reported until reduced
to money or the equivalent of money, whether the farmer is on the cash or accrual basis.
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4 (1957).
'It has been recommended that a tax be imposed on rental values of owner-occupied
homes in order to eliminate discrimination between owners and renters. An alternative
suggestion is to allow resident tenants a deduction of rental expenses. VICKREY, Op.
cit. supra note 2, at 18-24i Marsh, supra note 7, at 530. Rental values of owneroccupied homes are subjected to an income tax in England. For the English practice see
NEWPORT, INCOME TAX LAW AND PRAcrIcE (943);

TOLLEY, INCOME TAX CHART

MANUAL (1943).
T.D. 2137, 17 TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 48 (i915); G.C.M.
o486, XI-z
CUM. BULL. 14 (937) ; Rev. Rul. 273, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 221. And see Ostheimer
v. United States, - F.2d - (3d Cir. 1959).
'T.D. 2137, 17 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 48 (1915)i G.C.M. 10486, XI-i CUM.
BULL. 14 (1932).
" Ostheimer v. United States, P-H 1959 FED. TAX SERV. (3 AFTRid 886)
59-483
( 3 d Cir. Mar. 9, 3959).
8Rev. Rul. 273, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 221.
The Tax Court recently declined to

extend this exception to include as taxable income commissions received by an insurance
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A pair of cases closely related to the insurance agent rulings, Toy v.
Comissioner9 and Benjamin v. Hoey,10 dealing with the taxation of
imputed income in the context of profits derived from purchases made
through brokerage partnerships, reached results opposite to each other."'
The broad question of taxation of imputed income was again before
the Tax Court in the recent case of Kenneth W. Daehler.' The taxpayer, salesman for a real estate broker, wished to purchase for himself
for subdivision purposes a tract of land listed at $6oooo with another
broker. The taxpayer felt that $52,500 was a fair price for the land and
recognized that if he could buy through his employer at this figure he
could obtain the property at a net cost of $50,662.50, the difference
representing his commissions on the sale. Accordingly, taxpayer made a
formal offer of $52,500, which was accepted. This sum was paid by
checks to the listing broker, who returned five per cent as commission to
the taxpayer's employer. Of this amount, $1,837.50 was repaid the
taxpayer and listed on his employer's books as commissions paid. When
the taxpayer did not return this amount as income, the Commissioner
assessed a deficiency. The Tax Court, five judges dissenting,"3 reversed
broker on policies written on his own life. Sol Minzer, 3 T.C. No. 115 (.959). See
note 15, infra.
*20P-H 1942 B.T.A. AND T.C. MEM. DEC.
42,452.
13 9 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1944).
"xIn Toy, a partner in a real estate brokerage firm purchased several properties listed
with the firm, understanding that he would be able to procure them at the listed price
less the brokerage commissions. The firm received the commissions, listing them as
partnership income. The taxpayer's partner reported as income his entire distributive
share of partnership income, including that received in the transactions concerned, while
the taxpayer reported only his distributive share less one half the frm's commissions on
property which he had purchased through it. The Board of Tax Appeals, in holding
that the taxpayer's full distributive share was income, stated that the fact that he had
purchased from a partnership of which he was a member did not change his share of the
commission on such transactions into a discount on purchase price. In Benjamin, a
stockbroker was held not to have received income where he ran his personal transactions
through the brokerage of which he was a partner, even though the other partners returned as income their full distributive shares, including amounts representing commissions on these transactions. The court stated that this was money which the taxpayer had
paid to himself and that what one pays to one's self cannot be part of one's income.
There seems little factual basis for distinguishing these cases.
12 V T.C. No. 73 (x959).
The transaction involved took place in 1952, the
case arising under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 2z(a), which is substantially unchanged
in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
"'The dissenters stated: "The $1,837.50 which petitioner received from [his employer] was an employee's commission paid to him for personal services rendered by him
to such employer. It was computed at a 70 per cent rate, by taking into consideration
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the Commissioner, stating that the arrangement was merely a means
of purchasing property at a reduced price and that, as a result, taxpayer
realized no income on the transaction.
No attempt was made by the Tax Court to reconcile the Dachler
decision with rulings relating to the taxation of insurance commissions,
although these rulings appear to be more nearly analogous than any
other existing precedent. Both situations involve a purchase by a salesman, from or through his employer, of the very commodity or item
which the salesman was employed to sell, and a reduction in price
actually accruing to the employee by virtue of his employment contract.14
In addition to the fact that many imputed income situations involve
relatively trifling amounts, it seems dear that the general rule of nontaxation of imputed income reflects awareness of the extremely difficult
administrative problems which would arise in assessing the tax. As an
example, what wage value should be assigned to the laborings of a
housewife, and for how many hours a day? In this regard, of course,
the amount of income to be imputed from the agent's purchase of insurance on his own life is not difficult to measure, and this factor might
logically be thought to attract a tax. But this factor will not serve to
distinguish the typical insurance commission situation from the Daehler
the -olume of business transacted by petitioner under his employee arrangement with
said employeri and it was at the same rate as that which would have been paid to him
in the case of any other sales brought about by him." The dissent further points out
that

".

.

. the compensation paid by his employer in no way entered into the price

negotiations between petitioner and Hicks, the owner of the real estate." 3 T.C. No.
73, 6 (1959).
"'In Ostheimer v. United States, P-H 1959 FED. TAx SERV. (3AFTRzd 886, 889)
59-483 ( 3 d Cir. Mar. 9, 1959), the court discussed the problem of rebates in the
insurance commission cases, stating that "The insurance companies were required by
Pennsylvania statute to sell insurance to the public at fixed or uniform rates and taxpayer as a licensed insurance agent was likewise required by statute and by contract to
sell at the fixed rates and not to rebate his commission. . . . Had taxpayer not been
the agent who placed the policies he would not, and could not, have received the
commissions on the premiums. It was only in his capacity as agent that he was paid
these commissions." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 275 (1954).
For statutes prohibiting rebates of insurance premiums, see N.Y. INS. LAw. §§ 188,
209 (195o) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44.5 (Supp. 1957) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-52(8)
(1953 repl. vol.). Each of these, however, excludes commissions on policies written on
the agent's own life from the general proscription of rebates. The North Carolina
provision applies only to fire and casualty insurance.
The rebate laws might, at first glance, seem to indicate a ground of distinction
between the insurance commission cases and the Daehler case on the theory that there
can be no "cheap purchase" if no rebate is allowed. It is submitted, however, that the
real effect is the same whether or not the transaction can technically be labelled a
"cheap purchase."
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case, where the amount of income realized was equally easy to measure.
There is, however, a plausible ground for distinguishing the Daehler
case. In that case, as well as many others involving cheap -purchases,
it may not be necessary to tax the transaction which produced the imputed income in order to obtain a tax revenue from the benefit actually
received. Any reduction in the purchase -price of real estate or other
property will be reflected in a lower cash basis. Thus, upon subsequent
resale, a tax-will be imposed upon the entire gain realized, albeit often
at a capital gains rate. Moreover, there would seem to be a certain
equity in this treatment, since the resale would dearly establish the
amount of the income and also would place cash in the hands of the
taxpayer with which to pay his tax. Under this rationalization; the
cases are distinguishable, in as much. as insurance policies are neither
customarily acquired for resale nor readily marketable, while the realty
involved in the Daehler case, having been acquired for subdivision, was
probably intended for resale.
Under the foregoing analysis, then, the Daehler case can be squared
with existing precedent, which would have seemed to indicate a contrary result, only by assuming that probability of resale is a significant
determining factor. If this be true, however, a dearer articulation and
broader application of this factor would seem to be in order. Otherwise,
insurance agents are illogically singled out under 'the Tax Court's
current treatment of imputed income.' i
" In Ostheimer v. United States, supra note 14, at 889, involving an insurance agent,
the court stated: "Taxpayer has called our attention to Kenneth W. Daehler, ....
There it was held ...that the amount refunded to a real estate salesman by his employer as salesman's share of commission on a house the salesman himself bought constitutes a reduction of the price paid for the house rather than taxable income. With
respect to this case we need but say that we do not subscribe to its holding."
As this issue went to press, the Tax Court, seven judges dissenting, held that commissions on life insurance policies written by an insurance broker on his own life were
not taxable income, but merely represented a reduction in the cost of such insurance. The
court, referring to the word "commissions" as a "verbal trap" when applied to a reduction in cost of a broker's own insurance, stated that TD 2137, supra note 6, is specifically limited to cases where an employer-employee relationship exists between company and agent, and that it is explicit therein that a contrary result obtains in the
absence of such relationship. Since the case involved a broker who was not an employee,
the commissions were not and were not intended to be compensatory in nature. Sol
Minzer, 3 T.C. No. 115 (1959). Thus, the Tax Court, while perhaps achieving a
desirable result in eliminating discrimination against insurance brokers where imputed
income is involved, has by the use of a somewhat dubious distinction perpetuated that
same discrimination against the insurance agent.

